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STACKED RECOVERY UNDER THE
UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT OF
THE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Automobile accidents involving uninsured and negligent motorists have posed many difficult problems to both the insurance
industry and states desirious of providing monetary compensation
to those sustaining injuries on the nation's highways.' In response
to the injustice resulting when a non-negligent motorist's claims go
uncompensated, all states have now enacted so-called financial responsibility laws.2 Generally these laws carry a sanction of suspension of the driver's license and vehicle registration of any driver
involved in an accident if he is unable to provide proof of "financial
responsibility"-i.e., if he is incapable of showing that he is insured
to the statutory minimum3 or of posting bond as required by the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.4 The Indiana statute provides a
typical sanction:
If the person required to furnish proof of financial responsibility in the future or if the person required to furnish such
1. Estimates in 1968 indicated that at least 4% of the drivers in every state are uninsured, and in some states this figure may have been as high as 60%. Thus, at that time, there
were at least 5 million uninsured motorists in this country who were involved in a proportionate share of automobile accidents. See A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTOIST COVERAGE
v (1969) [hereinafter cited as WIDISS].
2. See Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation:Past,
Present and Future, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 215, 218 n.8 (1959). Connecticut was the first state to
adopt such legislation by enacting a "Financial Responsibility Law." Law of January 1, 1926,
ch. 183, [1925] Conn. Public Acts 2958 (repealed 1927).
3. At the present time, the common statutory minimum for bodily injury is $15,000 per
person and $30,000 per accident (15/30) liability limit. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1057
(Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 9-2-1-15 (1971). Proof that the negligent motorist has obtained the minimum liability vehicle policy with a bona fide insurer can be shown by filing
with the commissioner a written certificate of insurance issued by the insurance company
certifying that the insured is covered by a policy meeting the minimum requirements of the
state statutes. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1057 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 9-2-1-17
(1971).
4. The amount of bond or security required is usually within the discretion of the
commissioner sufficient to indemnify the injured party. Most states have a minimum threshold of $100, and a maximum governed by the amount set in that state for the minimum
liability insurance coverage. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1047 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND.
CODE § 9-2-1-4 (1971).
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security pursuant to the provisions. . , neglects or refuses
to comply with such requirements, the commissioner shall
thereupon suspend his current driving license and the registration of every motor vehicle owned by him.5
But it soon became obvious that most of these statutes were
deficient in a fundamental respect. The negligent and usually
judgment-proof uninsured motorist was not susceptible to the statutory sanctions until after he was involved in an injury-causing accident.' As a result, many serious bodily injuries still went uncompensated since the uninsured driver still had the "first bite."7 To bridge
this remaining gap in the protection of the insured motorist, almost
all states8 have now enacted statutes that make it mandatory for
every motor vehicle liability policy to incorporate an uninsured motorist (UM) endorsement.'
5. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-104(c) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 9-2-1-4(c) (1971). As for
nonresident drivers, most states give the commissioner power to revoke or suspend the license
of the motorist, or he may forbid the operation of a motor vehicle within the state. See, e.g.,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1057 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 9-2-1-12 (1971).
6. Compulsory insurance for all motorists would obviously be a solution, but most states
were very reluctant to take this drastic step which would generate its own difficulties. See
Lemmon, Cumpulsory Insurance-A Toxic Brew, 406 INs. L.J. 695 (1956). Furthermore,
efforts to revoke or suspend the license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident
regardless of whether he was at fault proved unsuccessful. The Supreme Court has held that
a state may not deprive a financially irresponsible driver of his operators license until there
is a "reasonable determination of the question whether there is the reasonable possibility of
a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 542 (1971).
7. Notman, A Decennial Study of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 5 (1968). The author points out the important fact that these laws actually only
require proof of future financial responsibility. See also PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTOISTS 4
(1972) [hereinafter cited as PRETZEL].
8. The only two exceptions are Maryland and New Jersey. These two states do, however, provide a substitute-an "unsatisfied judgment fund." The fund may be raised from
gasoline taxes, automobile registration fees or other sources which tend to spread the risk of
loss over the entire motoring public. When a loss is sustained and the negligent motorist is
uninsured, the state in effect becomes the insurer and pays the meritorious claims to the
innocent but injured motorists. Three other states have adopted this fund concept also (Michigan, New York and North Dakota), but these three states use it only to supplement the
uninsured motorist endorsement which is also required. See PRETZEL, supra note 7, at 16364.
9. The uninsured motorist endorsement was originally proposed by the insurance industry itself to both forestall compulsory liability insurance and to satisfy a general demand for
such a coverage. In 1957, New Hampshire became the first state to require uninsured motorist
coverage in all liability policies insuring any motor vehicles used or garaged within that state.
See WInIss, supra note 1, at 15. Indiana has a typical uninsured motorist statute and it
provides:
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The standard UM endorsement provides the insured with rights
against his own insurer co-extensive with those he would have had
against the uninsured tortfeasor.10 In event of an accident caused by
an uninsured driver, this endorsement protects the purchaser and
others defined by the policy by placing the insured in the position
he would have been had the other motorist carried the minimum
coverage required by the state financial responsibility laws." Such
coverage is made available to the insured as an endorsement entitled either "Uninsured Motorist Coverage" or "Family Protection
Insurance." Generally an additional premium is charged., 2
It must be stressed that the UM provision does not insure those
covered under the policy for the total amount of the judgment or
claim the insured obtains from the financially irresponsible driver.
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy or insurance insuring against
loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any
person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in [the financial
responsibility law, IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1055 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 9-2-115 (1971)], as amended heretofore and hereinafter, under policy provisions approved
by the Commissioner of Insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
Provided, That the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage
(in writing) and Provided further, That unless the named insured thereafter requests
such coverage, in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to
a renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the coverage, in connection
with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4310 (1969), IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1969).
10. This, of course, puts the insurer in the unique position of "attacking" his own
insurer, so this statement must be qualified in at least one important respect. The standard
UM endorsement contains an arbitration clause which provides the insured the method for
proceeding against his insurer to recover his claims under the UM provision in event of a
disagreement. Much controversy has resulted over this arbitration clause, and some states
have recently invalidated it. This issue, however, goes beyond the scope of the discussion here,
and for a complete treatment of the topic see Hapner, A Dozen Problems in Arbitration of
Uninsured Motorist Claims Under the American Arbitration Rules, 34 INs. COUNSEL J. 92
(1967). See also Christensen, Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 1966 INSURANCE ADJusTER 41.
11. This particular definition is somewhat in dispute, but is nevertheless the accepted
definition of purpose of uninsured motorist coverage set out by the leading authorities. See
12 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 45: 623 at 570 (1964); Wmiss, supra note 1, at 127.
12. Depending on the amount of coverage, the premiums range from $2 to $13 per year.
The average rate countrywide is $4. Wwiss, supra note 1, at 15 n.36.
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The standard UM endorsement and the uninsured motorist statutes
afford protection only to certain basic limits, the most common
being the minimum liability limit required by the state's financial
responsibility laws.' 3 Thus, if the insured's claim or judgment
against the uninsured motorist is greater than the limits set out by
the policy, he remains to that extent uncompensated. In those instances where liability limiting provisions within the UM endorsement are applicable, considerable litigation has resulted.'" Although
the disputes have been vigorous and the holdings diverse, the cases
show that several factors must necessarily be entertained: UM statutory construction, rules of interpretation unique to insurance contracts and public policy considerations.
One instance of such litigation results when the insured has
more than one policy or uninsured motorist coverage available to
him, and it is in this context that "stacking" has occured.' 5 Stacking, the attempt to recover under multiple UM endorsements, consists of placing one coverage upon another and recovering from each
successively until all damages are indemnified' 6 or until the aggregate policy limits are exhausted. The specific aspects of the problem
to be considered in this note can be illustrated by the following two
hypotheticals.
Hypothetical One: P is injured by a negligent uninsured
motorist. P owns several automobiles which are insured
under separate policies containing similar UM coverage. At
the time of the accident P is
(a) occupying host H's vehicle which is insured by a
policy issued to H, and that policy contains a UM
13. Most of the uninsured motorists statutes require that coverage be provided for
bodily injury or death in amounts set forth in the financial responsibility laws of the particular state. Insurance companies are extremely reluctant to provide more extensive coverage
even when requested by the insured. Id. at 136-37.
14. For a general survey of the litigation that has resulted from the various provision
limits of the uninsured motorist endorsement see Notman, A Decennial Study of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1968).
15. "Stacking" should be distinguished from permissible "layering." Layering occurs
when the insured purchases excess coverage in order to effect a premium saving. In such a
case the excess coverage is intended and paid for. The "primary" policy amount is regarded
by the excess carrier as a deductible sum. See PRETZEL, supra note 7, at 88 n.16.
16. Although the "stacking" of coverages has been permitted, no court has allowed
recovery beyond the claimant's damages-i.e., a "double recovery" is forbidden in all cases.
See, e.g., Ruder v. West American Ins. Co., - Ind. App. -, 280 N.E.2d 68 (1972).
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endorsement covering all occupants of that vehicle;
or
(b) either a pedestrian or occupying one of his own
vehicles.

Hypothetical Two: P is struck and injured by a negligent
uninsured motorist. P owns several automobiles, all of
which are insured under one policy and the UM endorsement shows
(a) separate and equal premiums listed for each vehicle; or
(b) separate but decreased premiums for the second
and third vehicles; or
(c) only one premium shown for all vehicles listed in
that policy.
This note will summarize and critically examine the various
rationales invoked to permit stacking under the several coverage
variations outlined above. Included is an analysis of the arguments
for permitting stacking in the multiple policy/multiple vehicle situation illustrated in hypothetical one. It is suggested that this type
of stacking, which could be called inter-policy stacking, be distinguished from the single policy/multiple vehicle instance represented
by hypothetical two. In addition, the latter intra-policy phenomenon is examined in order to determine the feasibility of permitting
stacking in such instances. A large number of courts that have faced
the issue now permit stacking." These courts and most authorities
see this as a desirable result in that the insured receiving a
"stacked" recovery is now afforded broader UM protection. This
note will suggest, however, that the stacking concept contains some
serious theoretical difficulties and that perhaps the recent extension
of stacking to the intra-policy situation will effectuate the very inequities that were thought to be obviated.
II.

INTER-POLICY STACKING: CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
THE "EXCESS-ESCAPE"

A.

UM

STATUTE AND

PARAGRAPH

A Contrast:Indiana and Illinois Decisions

As illustrated in hypothetical one, inter-policy stacking becomes possible when the injured insured has more than one policy
17. See Comment, 17 S.D.L. REv. 152 (1972). The author asserts that the jurisdictions
permitting stacking are now in the "recent majority."
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available to him. The insurance companies have anticipated such
situations, and certain liability limiting provisions have been inserted in the automobile liability policy. One such provision, called
the "other insurance" clause, was designed specifically to restrict
the insured to recovery under only one policy."s The first paragraph of that clause, dubbed the "excess-escape" paragraph,
applies when the insured is an occupant of an unowned insured
automobile, as shown in hypothetical 1(a). That paragraph provides:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying
a highway vehicle not owned by the named insured, this
insurance shall apply only as excess insurance over any
other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this
insurance shall then apply only in amount by which the
limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable
limit of liability of such other insurance."
In the context of hypothetical 1(a), this paragraph provides
that the policy applicable to the auto in which P is riding (i.e., H's
policy) is "primary" insurance, and P's policy is "secondary" coverage.20 Thus the paragraph limits P's insurer to coverage only to the
amount by which P's UM endorsement limit exceeds the liability
limit of H's UM endorsement. If, for example, H's policy granted
UM coverage of $10,000 per person, and P's policy $15,000 per person, then P's insurer would be liable for only $5,000-the "excess"
over the other insurance. But if both policies have identical UM
coverage limits, then P's insurer would "escape" liability entirely,
and P would have to look exclusively to his host's policy for recovery.
18. It should be noted that the "other insurance" clause applies also to the regular
liability provisions within the automobile liability policy, other than the uninsured motorist
endorsement to be discussed here. For such an expanded treatment of the "other insurance"
clause see Comment, Double Coverage in Automobile Insurance Policies-The Problem of
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 47 TuL. L. REv. 1039 (1973). See also Note, Automobile Liability
Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage, 58 MINN. L. Rav. 838 (1954); Comment, Concurrent
Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 319 (1965).
19. 1966 Standard Form Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, Part VI: Additional Conditions (E: Other Insurance).
20. The insurance industry has universally agreed with respect to uninsured motorist
coverage that the policy covering the vehicle which the insured is occupying will always afford
the "primary" coverage.
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A recent majority of state courts, including Indiana, have declared this excess-escape paragraph to be void, and have allowed the
insured primary recovery under both his host's policy and his own.2 '
Other courts considering the paragraph have held it to be an unambiguous and valid liability limiting provision." Although the decisions of several jurisdictions will be mentioned for purposes of discussion, primary emphasis will be focused upon Indiana and Illinois
decisions which competently represent the majority and minority
views respectively on inter-policy stacking.
A case of first impression in Indiana, Simpson v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company,2 dealt specifically with the excessescape paragraph of the "other insurance" clause. Pamela Simpson,
a minor, was an insured under two policies issued to her mother by
State Farm. Pamela was injured while riding as a passenger in an
auto not owned by her mother. The car was struck by a negligent
uninsured motorist and Pamela received injuries in excess of
$30,000. Another insurance company which afforded UM coverage
with respect to passengers in the vehicle she was occupying, paid to
Pamela its full policy limits of $10,000. The question before the
court was whether Pamela could stack her two policies (which also
had limits of $10,000 each) for a total recovery of $30,000. State
Farm asserted the policy defense that because its limits were identical to the limit of the policy issued to Pamela's host, the excessescape paragraph excused it from any liability.24 The company
21. A listing of the leading and most frequently cited cases in this burgeoning area will
suffice. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Romero, 428 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1970); Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Robey, 399 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968); Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
326 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Okla. 1971); Kackman v. Continental Ins. Co., 319 F. Supp. 540 (D.
Alaska 1970); Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970);
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606, 243 So. 2d 736 (1970); Patton v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America, Ind. App. _,
267 N.E.2d 859 (1971); Harthcock v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So.2d 456 (Miss. 1971); Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186
Neb. 121, 181 N.W.2d 835 (1970); Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33,
266 N.E.2d 566 (1971); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112
(1968).
22. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269, 275 P.2d 253 (1970); Harris v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 448 S.W.2d 652 (Ark. 1970); Morelock v. Millers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n of
Ill., 49 11. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971); Putnam v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 97,
269 N.E.2d 97 (1970); Cohen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 719, 315 N.Y.S.D.2d
265 (1970); Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).
23. 318 F. Supp 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
24. Id.at 1154.
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argued that it was the intent of the Indiana uninsured motorist
statute to afford protection in such amount as would have been
afforded had the uninsured motorist owned a liability policy containing the minimum limits.25 And since Pamela had already recovered from one source, a further limitation of liability would not
violate the purpose of the statute.
In a memorandum decision, Judge S. Hugh Dillion held the
excess-escape paragraph in conflict with the Indiana UM statute
and therefore void.16 He concluded that State Farm's argument was
unacceptable for three reasons: (1) the UM statute set out only a
minimum and not a maximum limit of recovery; (2) the statute
simply demands that each policy must provide UM protection; and
(3) since a premium was paid with respect to each policy, it would
be unconscionable to allow the insurer to deny recovery under both
policies.2
The only other reported case in point in Indiana is Patton v.
Saveco Insurance Company of North America. 21 In this case, the
Pattons were passengers in another's vehicle which was struck by
an uninsured motorist. Nine persons, including the Pattons, were
either injured or killed. The automobile in which they were riding
was insured under a policy issued to the host driver, and it provided
for UM coverage up to $20,000 for each accident. The Pattons
sought compensation under that policy. From the total payment of
$20,000 distributed among the nine persons, they received a settlement of $7,000. The Pattons then sought to recover the balance of
their damages under their own policy issued by Saveco, which provided for identical UM coverage. Saveco denied any liability, pointing to the standard excess-escape paragraph in the Patton's policy.2
The Indiana appellate court rejected Saveco's argument that
coverage under one policy was all that the statute required. The
court held that the excess-escape provision was an attempt by the
insurer to limit the application of the UM statute and was, therefore, void and unenforceable. 0 The court pointed out that if the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1156.
__
Ind. App.
267 N.E.2d 859 (1971).
Id. at __, 267 N.E.2d at 862.
Id. at __,
267 N.E.2d at 864.
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legislature had intended to limit the recovery to the limits of one
policy even though other policies were available, then the statute
would have been directed at the injured parties and not at each
policy of insurance."3
In contrast with this position, three Illinois decisions have held
that the excess-escape paragraph was a valid limitation of liability
not in derogation of the Illinois UM statute.32 In Morelock v. Millers
Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois,33 the Illinois Supreme
Court found that the same paragraph did not frustrate the legislative purpose and hence was not violative of public policy. The court
argued that if the excess-escape paragraph were held to be invalid,
the paradoxical result would be that an injured claimant would be
better off being struck by an uninsured motorist than he would be
had he been struck by a motorist owning the minimum liability
insurance .3 The court interpreted the legislative intent to require no
more than that compensation be available to at least the same
extent coverage is available for injury by a negligent tortfeasor who
is insured in compliance with the state's minimum liability limits.
B. Summary of Arguments Invoked to Invalidate the ExcessEscape Paragraph
In the decisions voiding this provision, the courts have used
several rationales. Each of those arguments is summarized below,
and an attempt will be made to show that these arguments are
unsound and not harmonious with the basic purpose of the uninsured motorist statutes. Although the recent trend has been to invalidate the paragraph, it is suggested that the minority view represented by the Illinois decisions reflects the better reasoning.
1. Unconscionability
Some courts have used the argument that the excess-escape
paragraph is unconscionable on the grounds that the insurer collects
31.
32.
Putnam
Ins. Co.,
33.
34.
35.

Id. at -,

267 N.E.2d at 862-64.
Morelock v. Millers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Ill., 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971);
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 48 I1. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97 (1970); Pestka v. Safeway
11 111. App. 3d 837, 289 N.E.2d 270 (1973).
49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
Id. at 236, 274 N.E.2d at 3.

Id.
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a premium and then denies liability. 6 One such court stated the
"unconscionability" argument in the following manner:
To allow the [insurer] to reduce its liability is a windfall
to the [insurer]. The plaintiffs have paid . . . for coverage,
and should have the benefit of it if necessary.3 7
Similarly, Judge Dillion in the Simpson case argued:
The premium paid with respect to each policy of insurance
necessarily includes an amount in payment of the uninsured motorist coverage; it would be unconscionable to permit the insurers to collect a premium . . . and then avoid
payment of a loss because of language of limitation devised
by themselves.
This unconscionability argument is anomalous in several respects. First, in the situation where, as in Patton, the insurer owns
only one vehicle, the argument is prima facie inapplicable.3 This is
because the premium charged and collected by the company was
undoubtedly actuarily based on the assumption that the excessescape clause was valid. 0 The premium paid by the insured afforded
him a UM endorsement containing an excess-escape paragraph and
that is what he received. The relatively inexpensive premium was
clearly a valid quid pro quo for the coverage received, and it is
indeed difficult to see any unconscionability involved.
36. See, e.g., Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D.
Ind. 1970); Protective Fire and Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 215, 181 N.W.2d 835, 838
(1970); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 396, 241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968).
37. Protective Fire and Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 215, 181 N.W.2d 835, 838
(1971).
38. 318 F. Supp. at 1156.
39. The Patton court, although invalidating the excess-escape paragraph, refused to use
the "unconscionability" argument.
The argument with regard to the collection of premiums for uninsured motorist
protection while limiting liability via the "excess-escape" clause had some validity
in Simpson because State Farm could have issued one rather than two policies.
However, such an argument adds nothing to the instant case because the premium
charged by Safeco's one policy was, without a doubt, computed on the assumption
that the "excess-escape" clause was valid and enforceable. It can hardly be contended that the rate charged by Safeco would be the same without the "excessescape" clause.
I__
nd. App. at __, 267 N.E.2d at 863.
40. Id.
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Secondly, in the situation where the insurer has issued several
policies and charged a premium for each one, the argument is at
first glance applicable." Such an instance occured in the Simpson
case and the court declared:
In the present case [the insurer] could have written one
policy covering both of Mrs. Simpson's automobiles, and
thus cut its uninsured motorist coverage in half, had it
desired to do so. In collecting two uninsured motorist premiums it took the accompanying gamble. 2
Under close scrutiny, however, this argument proves to be a specious one. The reasoning overlooks the fact that the scope of the
insurer's risk increases with the purchase of the second automobile.
Even though the first UM endorsement purchased covers the
"named insured," his spouse, and all household relatives of each,
independent of the owned automobile," it is nevertheless the case
that their exposure to the uninsured motorist is increased by the
purchase and operation of subsequent automobiles. Moreover, the
41. Such a situation is illustrated in hypothetical one.
42. 318 F. Supp. at 1152.
43. The standard uninsured motorist endorsement sets out three classes of persons who
are insured under the varying conditions by this coverage. These classes are defined in the
policy as follows:
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set forth below:
(a) the named insured and any designated insured and, while residents of the same
household, the spouse and relatives of either;
(b) any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle, and;
(c) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily
injury to which this insurance applies sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) above.
1966 Standard Form, Part II: Persons Insured. Coverage for those insureds defined by clause
(a) exists at all times. They are covered when they are operating or are passengers in any
vehicle, including an owned uninsured vehicle. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Robertson,__ Ind. App. -, 295 N.E.2d 626 (1973). The class defined by clause (a) is also
afforded protection when its members are pedestrians or engaged in any other activity. See
Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bittler, 235 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 1968).
Clause (b) covers any other person who is permissively occupying the vehicle named in
the policy. Thus, the class (a) insureds are protected independent of the insured vehicle, while
in contrast, the class (b) insureds are protected only by virtue of their occupancy in the
insured vehicle.
Clause (c) gives derivative coverage to individuals other than those sustaining the physical injury-the parents, guardians, executors, and administrators of the dead or injured
person covered under clause (a) or (b). Thus these persons defined by clause (c) may recover
if they have incurred medical expenses on behalf of the injured person, or suffer damages
because of loss of wages, wrongful death, etc. WIDIss, supra note 1, at 36.
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nonhousehold occupants of each automobile are also covered under
the UM endorsement of the policies covering each vehicle. Their
coverage is dependent upon occupancy of that insured car, and the
potential membership of this second class of insureds increases as
each vehicle is insured." The "accompanying gamble" which the
insurer takes is for this increased risk-not for multiple coverage
which the Simpson court awarded the clainiant. Thus, it seems
unreasonable to hold that the insurer is entitled to only one premium regardless of the number of vehicles the "named insured" owns
and insures.45
2.

Principle of Adequate Indemnification

A second rationale which the courts and writer have utilized to
invalidate the excess-escape paragraph could be called the "adequate indemnification" argument. One authority opting for the
majority view states:
[T]here is confrontation between, on the one hand, the
principle of adequate indemnification, and on the other
hand, clear and unambiguous policy language which in
some way restricts the coverage provided.
In this situation, the Other Insurance clause precludes recovery under the insured's own policy, even though primary
insurance is either completely exhausted by the other
claimants or pro rated among the claimants so that none
of them is adequately indemnified."
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court held in Protective Fire and
Casualty v. Woten:
It is obvious to us that it is undesirable to permit an insurer
to satisfy a statutory requirement by a policy provision that
reduces or eliminates liability in those instances where its
insured is not fully indemnified. 7
Parallel to this "adequate indemnification" argument is the argu44. Id.
45. The precise scope of this increased exposure or risk is to be considered below. See
note 90 infra and accompanying text.
46. WIDISS, supra note 1, at 106.
47. 181 N.W.2d at 838.
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ment that the UM statutes demand that the insured should be
payed "all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages."'" And since the excess-escape paragraph limits recovery
to only such sum as exceeds other insurance, it places a restriction
upon the requirement of the statute and is therefore void.
But these arguments prove far too much. If the claimant should
always be assured "adequate indemnification" and must be payed
"all sums he is legally entitled to recover," then it follows that all
liability limits should be ignored and the claimant's award should
then be governed only by the amount of his damages. But if policy
limits are to be followed, then the excess-escape paragraph should
be valid als6, for the policy is likewise limited by that unambiguous
provision.
3.

Plain Meaning Rationale

A third and perhaps most persuasive rationale could be entitled
the "plain meaning" argument. This view points out that the typical UM statute simply mandates that "No automobile liability...
policy . . . shall be delivered or issued . . . in this state unless
coverage is provided therein . . . in limits for bodily injury or death
set forth in [the financial responsibility act]."" This view argues
that it is the clear meaning of the statute that each and every policy
provide the insured with the minimum limits regardless of whether
other insurance is available to him. An example of such a viewpoint
is as follows:
We find no words in the statute indicating that one policy
is all that the statute requires. The statute requiring coverage does not say how much uninsured motorist coverage
shall be provided for each accident . . . . It requires each
policy to provide the minimum coverage, and the insurer's
"other insurance" clause is in direct conflict with the statute and is, therefore, voidA0
48. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Roby, 399 F.2d 330, 336 (8th Cir. 1968);
Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Safeco
Ins. Co. of America v. Jones, 243 So. 2d 736, 742 (Ala. 1970); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 395, 241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968).
49. See, e.g., the Indiana Uninsured Motorist statute at note 9 supra.
50. Harthcock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456 (Miss. 1971). Another
noteworthy case using this argument is Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831
(Ky. 1970). Even though the insurer in this case had issued two policies, only one premium
was charged and collected. The court nevertheless held that the claimant could recover under
both policies, even under the one for which he had paid no premium.
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The Indiana court in Patton also adopted this "plain meaning"
rationale and declared:
If the legislature had intended to limit recovery of persons
injured by an uninsured motorist to the limits of one policy,
even though such persons are covered by more than one
policy, [the UM statute] would be directed at the injured
parties and not at each policy of insurance. 5
This overly simplistic rule of construction, however, reflects a
nearsighted interpretation of the broad intent and language of the
statute. The thrust of the statute is not directed at each policy of
insurance, but rather, as the statute itself declares, "the protection
of persons insured . . . who are legally entitled to recover damages
from the owners and operators of the uninsured motor vehicles. .... ,,52
This broad purpose is further evidenced by the fact
that most UM statutes refer to the financial responsibility laws to
set the minimum liability limits.53 The obvious close relationship
between the two statutes seems to show that the purpose is to afford
the non-negligent insured protection not less than the minimum
limits set out by the legislature. The important fact would seem to
be that, under one policy or two, the insured be protected against
the uninsured motorist to the extent that the statute prescribes.
Furthermore, the argument that the statute demands aggregate
recovery under all the policies appears to be an incongrous requirement when the insurer could simply issue only one policy covering
all the vehicles owned by the named insured, collect only one premium, and thus supposedly "reduce" its coverage to only one allowaMeridian undertakes to distinguish the cases we have relied upon to support our
principle holding herein, on the ground that they gave emphasis to the fact that the
insured in those cases had paid more than one premium, where as in the instant case
[claimant] had paid only one premium. We do not find any merit in that distinction
because Meridian, being required by statute to offer uninsured motorist coverage
with each policy, was entitled to collect two premiums from the [claimant].
451 S.W.2d at 835. But see Morelock v. Millers' Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Ill., 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274
N.E.2d 1 (1971); Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739
(1971).
51. 267 N.E.2d at 864.
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4310 (1969), IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1969). See note 9 supra.
53. For an expanded treatment of the origin and history of the uninsured motorists
statutes and the financial responsibility laws see Murphy and Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEO. L. J. 700 (1959).
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ble recovery. Since this reduction is obviously permissible," the
argument that each policy issued to the insured covering each vehicle must afford him primary coverage is a meaningless demand. The
only possible reason that the statute requires that each policy "pro-

vides" UM coverage is to eliminate the possibility where the insured
has purchased several policies and only one of them contains an UM
endorsement. Thus, if that particular policy were ever cancelled, the
insured would be without uninsured motorist coverage-at least
until it was added to one of his remaining policies. But that possibility, which would frustrate the purpose of the statute, is eliminated
by UM coverage for each policy based on the validity of the excessescape paragraph. This assures the insured coverage even though
one or more of the policies were cancelled-and the insured at no
time is charged for or receives less coverage than what he has payed
for or what the UM statute broadly requires.
III.

INTER-POLICY STACKING: THE PRO-RATA PARAGRAPH INVALIDATED

A second situation involving the inter-policy stacking issue
arises when an insured is injured by a negligent uninsured motorist
while he is not occupying another's insured vehicle, but nevertheless
is covered by two or more policies (as illustrated in hypothetical
1(b)). In these instances the "pro-rata" paragraph of the "other
insurance" clause is applicable. That provision reads:
Except as provided in the foregoing [excess-escape] paragraph, if the insured has other similar insurance available
to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall
be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and
the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of
any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of
liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance and other such insurance. 55
This paragraph provides that when the insured has "other similar
insurance available," the amount of recovery is not to exceed the
highest of the limits of the several insurance policies. Furthermore,
the insurance company will be liable only for a proportionate share
54.
55.

See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
1966 Standard Form, Part VI: Additional Conditions (E. Other Insurance).
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of the insured's claim. Stated another way, this paragraph holds
that the damages will be "prorated" among the policies available
to the injured insured. The effect of this provision is similar to that
of the excess-escape paragraph-the claimant's recovery is restricted to the liability limit fixed by the maximum limit of the
highest of the several policies.
In recent years many of the jurisdictions considering the "other
insurance" clause have likewise invalidated this paragraph, invoking essentially the same arguments used to void the excess-escape
provision.5 The most common argument used to strike down this
liability limiting provision is a combination of the "adequate indemnification" and "unconscionability" rationales.
When there are in fact two separate policies, with two separate uninsured motorist endorsements, it seems justifiable
as in the case of the [excess-escape] paragraph to invalidate the limitation upon liability . . . . Of course, there is
an advantage to the insured, or as some insurers have put
it, a "windfall" to the insured. By the same token, allowing
the insurance company to reduce its liability is a "windfall"
to the company. In these cases, where two or more endorsements have been separately purchased and paid for, there
is the same justification for allowing the claimant to obtain
complete indemnification as exists with respect to the
excess-escape clause .
58
The fallacy of this reasoning has been treated earlier,59 but one
56. This can be illustrated by using hypothetical 1(b). Suppose P obtains two policies
from two different companies, and each has an uninsured motorist policy limit of $15,000 per
person. Even if P is injured to the extent of $30,000, the pro-rata paragraph restricts his total
recovery to $15,000-$7,500 from each of the two policies. The same result would occur if both
policies were issued by the same company, for then the claimant would likewise theoretically
recover only $7,500 from each policy.
57. Woolston v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 306 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Ark. 1969); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 266 Ga. 710, 177 S.E.2d 257 (1970); Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La. 75, 254 So. 2d 22 (1972); Boettner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 388
Mich. 482, 201 N.W.2d 795 (1972); Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 155
S.E.2d 128 (1965). Contra, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 213 A.2d 608 (Del. Super. 1970);
Graham v. Am. Gas Co. of Reading, Pa., 244 So. 2d 272 (Pa. 1971); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Bafus, 77 Wash. 2d 720, 466 P.2d 159 (1970).
58. WIDISS, supra note 1, at 115.
59. See notes 36 through 48 supra and accompanying text.
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similar counter-argument should be mentioned at this point. The
type of argument represented in the above quote is misleading in
that it implies that the insurer collects a premium for a certain
stated coverage and then surrepticiously "reduces" that coverage by
the insertion of the "other insurance" clause. Theoretically, however, this analysis is both improper and unjustified. The "other
insurance" clause is not a "reduction" of coverage-it is a limitation
of liability. The insured has paid a premium for a policy with unambiguous liability limits of which the "other insurance" clause is an
integral part, and to afford the insured a recovery that is double the
policy limits is to create a new contract between the parties. No
court has asserted that the premiums collected were not based on
the validity of the policy liability limits, so it is indeed difficult to
see that the limitation of recovery to one policy is unconscionable.
Some Inconsistencies
At least one court has invalidated the excess-escape clause, but
yet held the pro-rata paragraph to be effective. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company v. Ealy,60 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held the pro-rata provision valid and denied the type
of stacking illustrated in hypothetical 1(b). Four years earlier, however, the same court had declared the excess-escape paragraph invalid in Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Blumling.6 ' The
claimant in Blumling had recovered $10,000 under the UM provision in his host's policy. The court allowed the claimant to recover
under his own policy also, stating:
[Insurer] has received its premium attributable to this
coverage, which the statute requires it to furnish. We will
not permit it to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by its
unilateral insertion of a liability limiting clause repugnant
to the statute.
We hold . . . that where the loss exceeds the limits of
one policy, the insured may proceed under other available
policies up to their individual limits .
60.
61.
62.

221 Pa. Super. 138, 289 A.2d 113 (1972).
429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968).
241 A.2d at 115 (emphasis supplied).
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It should be noted in passing that the Blumling decision soon became a leading case for courts invalidating both paragraphs of the
"other insurance" clause.6 3 And the "plain meaning" and "unconscionability" arguments present in the opinion appear to be the
typical rationales used.
Yet, when confronted with a bona fide pro-rata situation in
Ealy, the same court would not allow the claimant to stack his five
policies for which he had paid separate premiums. The same court
that decided Blumling balked when faced with this multiple policy
situation and permitted the insured recovery under only one of his
five policies. 4 Obviously compromising their original position in
Blumling where the insured was allowed to "proceed under other
available policies,"6 5 the Ealy court declared that the thrust of the
UM statute was merely to assure that "the innocent victims are not
left completely uncompensated"66 and that the insurance companies are required only to provide "at least minimal coverage." 7 The
insured was not allowed to stack because he had "contractually
agreed not to cumulate the coverages on the five vehicles." 8
But it is clear that if the Ealy court found the insured's contractual agreement not to stack pursuant to the pro-rata paragraph to
have been proper, then this is a fortiori true of the excess-escape
paragraph in Blumling19 The court struggled to distinguish
Blumling:
The repugnant clause in Blumling provided the insured
with less than the minimum uninsured motorist coverage
required by the statute . . . . We see nothing repugnant in
the [pro-rata paragraph] in question. Under each policy
the insured is given the full protection required in the act.
There is nothing in the policy which gives the insured less
insurance than is required as there was in Blumling. ....
.0

63. See Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
64. 221 Pa. Super. at 140, 289 A.2d at 115.
65. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
66. 221 Pa. Super. at 140, 289 A.2d at 115.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. If the pro-rata paragraph is a valid limitation because it was contractually agreed
upon, it seems clear that this argument likewise holds true for the excess-escape paragraph
which also limits the insurer's liability.
70. 221 Pa. Super. at 141, 289 A.2d at 116.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/5

19741

et al.: Stacked Recovery Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement of the

UNINSURED MOTORIST

It should be clear from a comparison of the above quotes from
Blumling and Ealy that this court seemingly wants to have it both
ways on the stacking issue. Apparently sensing the reductio ad
absurdum that results when inter-policy stacking is permitted,7 ' the
court attempted to draw a fundamental distinction between the
pro-rata and excess-escape paragraphs. No such effectual distinction exists, however,7 2 and it is suggested that such an eclectic approach evidences the inherent weakness of the rationales invoked to
permit inter-policy stacking. The Ealy case is crucial in that it
illustrates the absurd coverage extensions that will inevitably result
when the stacking concept is carried to its logical extreme. The Ealy
case is also illustrative of the present confusion among the courts
that have permitted inter-policy stacking irrespective of the underlying difficulties with that position outlined above.
IV.

INTRA-POLICY STACKING

In recent years the "stacking" concept has been extended to a
single automobile liability policy covering more than one vehicle.73
71. If stacking were allowed in Ealy, the insurer would have been liable up to $.1 million
(5 x 10/20 limits) on each automobile for each accident.
72. Suppose, for example, that the claimant in Ealy had been riding in an unowned
insured vehicle. Then only the excess-escape paragraph would have been in issue, as in
Blumling. Since the court had declared that paragraph invalid in Blumling, supposedly
the claimant could then stack all five of his policies, in addition to the recovery under his
host's policy. Thus there seems to be no effectual distinction between Blumling (excessescape) and Ealy (pro-rata). No other court or authority could be found that makes such a
fundamental distinction between the two paragraphs of the "other insurance" clause.
73. Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., Civil No. 71 H 329 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 1972);
Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973); Jefferies v. Stewart,
Ind. App. -, 309 N.E.2d 448 (1974); Rosson v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 795,
457 P.2d 42 (1969); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 42 (1969); Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Jackson, 270 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1971); Hartford Accid.
and Indem. Co. v. Turner, 498 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App. 1973); Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972); Lipscome v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 213
Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972). Contra, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Schmitka, 12 Cal. App. 3d 59, 90
Cal. Rptr. 399 (1970); Ringenburger v. General Accident & Life Assur. Corp., Ltd., 214 So.2d
376 (Fla. App. 1968); Doerpinghaus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 296 Ga. App. 627, 185 S.E.2d 615
(1971); Glidden v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 11 Ill. App. 3d 81, 296 N.E.2d 84 (1973); Otto v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 2 111. App. 3d 66, 275 N.E.2d 766 (1971); Arminski v. United States Fidelity,
23 Mich. App. 352, 178 N.W.2d 497 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. McHugh, 124 N.J. Super. 105,
304 A.2d 777 (1973); Polland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966);
Kennedy v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Ore. 425, 467 P.2d 963 (1970); Castle v.
United Pacific Ins. Group, 252 Ore. 44,448 P.2d 357 (1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blair,
186 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1972); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972).
The jurisdictions permitting intra-policy stacking are clearly in the minority.
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The claimant insured under the provisions of the policy is permitted
to aggregate the limits of the units of coverage in that policy to
satisfy a claim against the insurer. This enables a recovery of a sum
equal to the stated liability limits multiplied by the number of
vehicles covered under that policy. Several of the courts favoring
inter-policy stacking have simply expanded their multiple recovery
rationale to incorporate the single policy/multiple vehicle instance.
[W]e perceive no reason why a different rule should apply
merely because the insurance coverage afforded on different
vehicles is combined in one instead of two policies. This is
particularly true when each of the insured vehicles is separately described, the coverage granted under the policy is
separately listed for each vehicle, and a separate premium
charged . . . to each of the described vehicles . . .
It is suggested, however, that several distinctions must be drawn
between the two instances, and that the rationale for allowing intrapolicy stacking is even less persuasive than permitting the former
multiple policy type.
First, those jurisdictions that have invoked the "plain meaning" rationale permitting inter-policy stacking have seemingly
closed the door to stacking of the one policy/multiple vehicle variety."5 That reasoning held that the "thrust" of the UM statutes was
aimed at each policy and not at each vehicle. Therefore, if the
company issues only one policy it would appear that the courts
using that rationale would have to be satisfied and hold that only
one coverage afforded under a single policy is harmonious with the
UM statutes. Thus the most persuasive rationale for allowing interpolicy stacking is unavailable here to the proponents of intra-policy
pyramiding.
Another distinction exists in that the supposedly invalid "other
insurance" clause is not in issue here-there is only one policy involved so that provision is inapplicable. Indeed, numerous jurisdictions which have invalidated the "other insurance" clause and
allowed inter-policy stacking, have strongly refused to permit stack74.
75.
76.

Sellers v. Governmental Employees Ins. Co., 214 So. 2d 879, 882 (Fla. App. 1968).
See notes 49 through 53 supra and accompanying text.
Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 66, 71, 275 N.E.2d 766, 771 (1971).
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ing within a single policy." These courts have generally asserted
that multiple policy stacking carries with it no logical or practical
implication that "internal" stacking should be permitted, perhaps
feeling that the stacking concept has been carried too far. Notwithstanding these disparities, several jurisdictions have held that intrapolicy stacking is permissible up to the extent of the claimant's
damages. Again, several unconvincing arguments have been entertained.
A.

Rationales for Allowing Intra-policy Stacking

1. One Policy Equals Several Contracts
Some claimants have successfully argued that a common provision in the auto liability policy has the effect of making the one
policy covering several vehicles actually several contracts. 8 The relevant provision, called the "separability" clause, reads typically as
follows: "When two or more automobiles are insured by this policy,
the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each . . . .'" The
claimants have argued that the effect of this clause is that the
insurer has in fact issued separate contracts covering each of the
vehicles.8 0 The thrust of this argument is that the two "separate"
contracts should then be given the same treatment as in the interpolicy situation. In the past this reasoning has been accepted by
only a very few courts, and recently an overwhelming number of
cases have held that this provision means nothing more than to
render the policy applicable to whichever insured vehicle was involved in an accident."
2.

Ambiguity Construed Against the Insurer
Although the "other insurance" clause is not involved in the

77. Compare Arminski v. United States Fidelity, 23 Mich. App. 352, 178 N.W.2d 497
(1970); Talbot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 701 (Miss. 1974); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. McHugh, 124 N.J. Super. 105, 304 A.2d 777 (1973); Kennedy v. American Hardware
Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Ore. 425, 467 P.2d 963 (1970) with respectively Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau
Mich. App,__, 188 N.W.2d 216 (1971); Harthcock v. State Farm Mut.
Mut, Ins. Co., Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456 (Miss. 1971); McFarland v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 120 N.J.
Super. 554, 295 A.2d 375 (1972); Smith v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512
(1965).
309 N.E.2d 448 (1974).
78. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Stewart, __ Ind. App. -,
79. Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1263, 1264 (1971).
80. Id. at 1263-67.
81. Id. at 1266.
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intra-policy situation, insurance companies have defined the liability limits applicable to the single policy instance also. The relevant
provision is the "Limits of Liability" clause which provides:
The limit of liability stated in the declarations (coverages)
as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's
liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained
by one person as the result of any one accident and, subject
to the above provision respecting "each person," the limit
of liability stated in the declarations (coverages) as applicable to "each accident" is the total limit of the company's
liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained
by two or more persons as the result of any one accident. 2
The most common rationale among those jurisdiction which permit
intra-policy stacking is that the combination of the limits of liability
clause and the payment of separate premiums creates an ambiguity
which must be strictly construed against the insurer."
In an unreported Indiana decision, Dunn v. Meridian Mutual
Insurance Company, 4 the court found such ambiguity and allowed
the insured to stack within his policy. The claimant, Mr. Dunn, was
riding as a guest in another's insured vehicle when he was injured
by an uninsured motorist. The vehicle in which he was riding was
covered by a policy issued to Dunn's host by Meridian, and the
policy also insured two other vehicles owned by the host driver.
Dunn's policy, issued by Emasco Insurance Company, also contained UM coverage on two vehicles owned by Dunn. The Meridian
policy showed only one premium listed for all the host's vehicles,
and the court held that the language of that policy was not so
ambiguous as to be susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.15 Dunn was allowed only one recovery under that policy-the coverage applicable to the vehicle in which he was riding.
The Emasco policy, however, which listed separate premiums for
each automobile, was found to be ambiguous and Dunn was permit82.
83.
Jefferies
Co., 203
84.
85.

1966 Standard Form Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, Part InI: Limits of Liability.
Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., Civil No. 71 H 329 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 16, 1972);
v. Stewart, __ Ind. App. -, 309 N.E.2d 448 (1974); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins.
Kan. 783, 790, 457 P.2d 34, 41 (1969).
Civil No. 71 H 329 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 16, 1972).
Id. at 8.
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ted to stack the "coverages" applicable to each vehicle."
[I]t is not entirely clear that the term "coverages" [in the
Limits of Liability clause] relates only to entirely distinct
coverages of which uninsured motorist coverage is one,
rather than separate coverages upon each vehicle for uninsured motorist protection. The Emasco policy uses the plural "coverages" and in addition lists separate premiums for
the two cars covered by the policy. The uncertainty thus
created probably results because the form used was not
designed for a kind of coverage not tied to a particular
automobile."
This does not appear to be entirely true, however, for the coverage afforded the second class of insureds (nonhousehold occupants
of the named insured's automobiles) is tied to the particular automobile in which they are riding. That class of insureds is not covered
when occupying an uninsured vehicle owned by the named insured,
even though the named insured, his spouse, and household relatives
of each are covered also in this situation. Therefore, in light of the
fact that the coverage is dependent on a particular automobile, the
ambiguity found appears to be somewhat strained.8
3.

Unconscionability

The unconscionability argument is invoked to sustain intrapolicy stacking also, and the basic tenets are equivalent to those
used in the multiple policy situation. A concise example of the
argument is quoted here for purposes of discussion.
If, in paying one premium for a single automobile, coverage
is purchased while occupying the insured automobile along
with coverage not tied to that automobile, the question
might well be asked, What coverage is intended by pay86. Id.
.87. Id. at 7.
88. See note 43 supra. The host's Meridian policy also used the plural "coverages."
Thus the only distinction between the two policies was that the Emasco policy had listed
several premiums in contrast with the one premium charged by Meridian. It is interesting to
note, however, that the court made no mention of the actual cost of the single premium. It
might well have been equal to the sum of the separate premiums charged, for example, in
the Emasco policy. Thus the distinction drawn between the two policies appears to be very
attenuated.
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ment of an equal premium for a second automobile?
When we pay a double premium we expect double coverage. This is certainly not unreasonable, but is in accord
with general principles of indemnity that amounts of premiums are based on amounts of liability. Insurer argues that
what plaintiff is seeking amounts to pyramiding coverages
but nothing is said about pyramiding the premiums which
effectuate the coverages."9
The fallacy of this argument is readily demonstrable. It is true
that the first class of insureds is afforded coverage by the payment
of the first premium, and that coverage is independent of the owned
automobile. Notwithstanding this, the addition of the second and
subsequent automobiles does increase the insurer's risk in two respects:
(1) Even though the first class of insureds is afforded UM
coverage while they are pedestrians or guests in another's
vehicle, it is clear that a family operating a fleet of automobiles simultaneously has a much greater chance of a member being struck and injured by an uninsured motorist than
if that family owned and operated only one vehicle. The
father commuting home from work in his compact, the
mother going to her bridge club in her sedan, and the teenage son driving his new convertible-the entire risk and
exposure is much more than when the family owned only
the stationwagon.
(2) There is also an increased risk with regard to the second class of insureds-the non-household passengers in
each of the vehicles. Thus it is conceivable that the father
could be participating in a car pool, the mother picking up
her bridge partners, and the son showing his recently acquired vehicle to a carload of friends. All the passengers in
all the vehicles are covered.
This dual aspect of the increased risk provides the answer to the
question of what coverage is intended by the payment of a second
89. Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 791-92, 457 P.2d 34, 41, 42 (1969). See
also Cunningham v. Ins. Co. of North America, 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972).
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premium for a second automobile. When one pays a double premium he expects double coverage, but not when the risk has correspondingly increased. It is extremely difficult to see how the courts
favoring intra-policy stacking can demand that the insurer can collect only one $4 premium regardless of whether the family owns one
vehicle or five. The simple argument that the UM endorsement
follows the individual rather than the vehicle and therefore if a
premium is collected for separate vehicles the insureds are entitled
to multiple coverage, ignores the expansion of risk to both classes
of insureds resulting from operation of subsequent vehicles."
B.

Form of Premiums Listed: Equal, Decreased, or Single

In policies covering multiple vehicles, some insurers have listed
separate and equal premiums for each auto, while others have listed
one price for the first vehicle and a decreased premium for the
remaining autos. Several courts have found a decreased premium on
the second and subsequent vehicles to be a relevant factor in denying stacking.9 Other courts, however, have held the decreased premiums to be irrelevant," and have permitted intra-policy stacking
irrespective of this fact.93 There is considerable confusion among the
90. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. McHugh, 124 N.J. Super. 105,106, 304 A.2d 777, 778 (1973).
There is, however, increased risk incurred by the carrier when insuring separate
motor vehicles under Coverage S [the UM endorsement]. It is conceivable that
McHugh could be operating one vehicle with multiple passengers therein, his wife
operating the second vehicle with multiple passengers therein. All the passengers in
both vehicles are covered under Coverage S. This increased risk provides sufficient
consideration for charging a second premium at the same rate for additional cars on
the same policy.
See also Note, Limitations of Liability Within Uninsured Motorist Insurance Policies and
Their Validity Under Mandatory Statutes, 52 NEB. L.R. 158, 177 n.80 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 66, 275 N.E.2d 766, 770 (1971)
(decreased premium-stacking denied); Ringenburger v. General Accident Fire and Life
Assur. Corp., 214 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 1968) (decreased premium-stacking denied). Accord,
Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 795, 457 P.2d 42 (1968) (equal premiums-stacking
permitted).
92. Most multiple vehicle policies with decreased premiums list a stable decreased
premium after the second vehicle; that is, the premium charged for the third and subsequent
vehicles usually remains constant.
93. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 270 So. 2d 792 (Ala. 1972) (decreased premium-stacking permitted); Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Jackson, 270 So. 2d 806
(Ala. 1972) (decreased premium-stacking permitted); Hartford Accid. and Indem. Co. v.
Turner, 498 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App. 1973) (decreased premium-stacking permitted). The
Jackson court stated unequivocally:
We feel that the insured was insured as to two policies whether the policies were
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courts regarding this aspect of the UM endorsement format, and it
is difficult to estimate what effect the unequal premiums will have
on the courts facing stacking in the future. It would seem that if
these courts permit stacking on the grounds that the insureds are
completely covered by the payment of the first premium, then it is
only logically consistent for them to hold that any additional premium for whatever amount is a "windfall" to the insurer.9 4
This raises the further question of whether the payment of a
single premium, even though increased with the addition of each
vehicle to the policy, would be the solution.95 Obviously it would
help eliminate the supposed ambiguity that some courts have found
within the "limits of liability" clause,9" but it is contended that this
would not satisfy the unconscionability argument. Though there
would be only one premium charged, this premium would nevertheless reflect an increase with every vehicle added to the policy. Thus
the single premium would merely disguise the additional charge
(windfall) for each vehicle, and presumably the proponents of intrapolicy stacking would allow aggregate recovery here also. Thus, in
order to argue intra-policy stacking cogently, it must be held that
the insurer can charge only one initial and stable premium for UM
coverage even if additional vehicles are added to the policy.
The unavoidable consequence of this is that the universally
charged premium will be computed or averaged on the insurer's risk
with respect to all of its policies, including those covering numerous
vehicles. 7 The effect of this forced alternative can only lead to ineseparate or whether both vehicles were listed in the same policy, and we fail to see
any distinction in the fact that the premium for the uninsured motorist coverage was
one dollar less for the second vehicle.
270 So. 2d at 810.
94. The basic argument for permitting stacking firmly holds that the first premium
affords the named insured UM coverage irrespective of which (owned or unowned) automobile
he occupies. Thus any additional premium charge for subsequent vehicles would appear, by
this reasoning, to be redundant.
95. For example, a $4 premium charged for a policy covering one vehicle, an $8 premium for a policy covering two vehicles, a $12 premium for three vehicles, etc.
96. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
97. In light of the increased risk, this increased charge will certainly be justified. See
note 89 supra and accompanying text. See also, WmIss, supra note 1, at 112.
At the same time, it seems eminently justifiable to argue that the [liability limitations] should be modified to extend this coverage uniformly. To the extent that risk
is increased, companies can seek an increase in their premiums.
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quitable and undesirable results. First, the impecunious student or
low-income family who can afford only one automobile will be required to pay that increased actuarily averaged premium in order
to obtain the minimum UM coverage. With one increased premium
being charged to every insured regardless of the number of vehicles
owned by that insured, it is evident that the one-car family will in
effect be paying partly for the UM coverage of the more affluent
multiple-vehicle family. Second, since most UM statues permit the
insured to reject in writing the UM endorsement, it is possible that
the increased premium will be an incentive to waive that coverage.9"
C.

Intra-policy Stacking of the Host's Policy

In the multiple policy situation (illustrated in hypothetical
1(a)) where the passenger can recover under the host's policy covering occupants of that insured vehicle, it is readily apparent that the
passenger could not recover under other policies issued to the host
insuring other owned vehicles. This is because the coverage afforded
the non-household passengers arises only because they are covered
by the one policy covering the vehicle which they are occupying-no
other policy is available. 9 Thus an occupant insured could never
receive a stacked recovery from his host's insurer, even though the
host owned several other policies covering his other vehicles.
However, under the recent expansion of the stacking concept to
the intra-policy situation, it could conceivably be argued that the
occupant insured could receive a stacked recovery from the host's
insurer. Indeed, it could be contended that once a person becomes
an "insured" he is entitled to all the coverage provided by the policy
available to him, regardless of whether he becomes insured by virtue
of being a named insured or by virtue of being a non-household
occupant of the insured vehicle. For if the named insured is entitled
to a stacked recovery under the one multiple vehicle policy, then it
would follow that his spouse, household relatives and other occupants of the vehicle who are likewise covered by that one policy
should receive similar protection.
98. The uninsured motorist statutes in many states give the insured the right to reject
the UM endorsement. Many such states require the rejection in writing. See, e.g., the Indiana
uninsured motorist statute at note 9 supra.
99. See note 43 supra.
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In a recent Indiana decision, Dunn v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, 00 the passenger insured attempted to obtain a
stacked recovery under his host's policy which insured three vehicles. The court refused the stacking of the host's policy, but only
because one premium had been charged under that policy.'"' The
claimant was permitted, however, to stack within his own policy
since multiple premiums were charged and paid. °2 Thus the only
distinction between the two policies was the number of premiums
charged, and it is clear from the language of the opinion that had
the host's policy contained multiple premiums, that policy would
have been susceptible to a stacked recovery also.se
In Cunningham v. Insurance Company of North America, °4 the
Virginia Supreme Court faced a situation where the host had paid
separate and equal premiums for the several vehicles covered under
the policy. The claimant in this case was confronted with what
could be considered the ultimate in intra-policy stacking possibilities. Mr. Cunningham was an employee of the Virginia Department
of Highways and was riding in a Department vehicle when it was
struck by a negligent uninsured motorist. Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland) had issued to the Department a single automobile
liability policy which afforded UM coverage to 4,368 state-owned
vehicles. Separate and equal premiums of $4 were listed for each
vehicle. Cunningham was also covered by a policy which afforded
100. Civil No. 71 H 329 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 16, 1972).
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 14.
103. The memorandum decision at no time mentions any conceptual difficulty with the
passenger obtaining stacked recovery under his host's policy. In fact, it is clear that the only
factor that "saved" the host's insurer was that it had listed only one premium. There are,
however, two serious difficulties with the non-household passenger attempting to stack within
his host's policy. First of all, the unconscionability argument invoked for stacking is not
relevant to the non-household class (b) insured. The class (b) insured has paid no premium
whatsoever-unconscionability with respect to premium payment is not germane to his status.
Secondly, in light of the recent holding in Jefferies v. Stewart, - Ind. App. -, 309
N.E.2d 448 (1974), which held that the separability clause renders the single policy to be
many "policies," it would be extremely difficult for the class (b) insured to argue that he
should recover under all the "policies." Indeed, if there are several "policies," then he could
recover under only one of them-the one applicable to the automobile in which he was a
passenger. He is clearly not an insured under the other "policies" since he was not occupying
the vehicles covered by those "policies."
104. 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972).
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UM coverage on three automobiles owned by him, and a premium
of $4 was listed for each of his vehicles. Cunningham received a
judgment of $40,000 from the uninsured motorist and attempted to
obtain a stacked recovery under the Maryland policy.' 5
Maryland admitted it provided primary coverage, but argued
that the liability limit of the policy was $15,000 and that the remaining portion should be paid by Cunningham's insurer. Maryland pointed out that to hold otherwise would mean that for the
premium of $4 on each vehicle insured under its policy, each of the
4,368 vehicles would have had a bodily injury limit for each person
of $65,520,000 and total liability limits for each accident of
$131,040,000. Cunningham's insurer, Insurance Company of North
America (INA), similarly argued that if stacking were permitted
within its policy, it would be liable up to $90,000 for each accident
06
involving Cunningham.
The court held that Cunningham could stack within his INA
policy on the familiar ground that "where he has paid separate
premiums he is entitled to separate coverages."'' 0 But he was allowed only one coverage under the Maryland policy. The court
looked to the distinction between the two classes of insureds, and
since Cunningham was not a "named insured" under the Department's policy he was entitled to a single recovery only.

A

. . .distinction between the type of coverage provided a
named insured in a policy and other insureds exists because
those of the second class did not buy the policy. He did not
pay Maryland one premium or any multiple premiums.
This was done by the named insured [Department] to
provide the minimum coverage required by the laws of Virginia. The Department did not intend to provide multiple
coverage to every permissive user of its vehicles. It purchased the broad coverage for the Department and the statutory coverage for the permissive occupants of its vehicles.'"'

The Cunningham case is crucial with respect to the stacking
105.
106.
107.
108.

213 Va. at 74, 189 S.E.2d at 834.
Id.
Id. at 76, 189 S.E.2d at 836.
Id. at 75, 189 S.E.2d at 835.
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concept, for the court was directly confronted with the absurd coverage extensions which unavoidably occur when stacking is permitted.
The court attempted to avoid these implications by distinguishing
between the two types of coverages purchased under the Maryland
policy, but this distinction is fraught with difficulties. If the Department "did not intend" to provide multiple coverage to the occupants of its vehicles, the questions might be asked: What if the
Department had intended to provide multiple coverage? Would
Maryland then be required to provide a stacked recovery? Furthermore, it is not at all clear what "broad coverage" was purchased for
the Department apart from the "statutory coverage" for the occupants. Certainly the Department itself could never receive any bodily injuries, so it appears that actually the named insured (the Department) was afforded no coverage at all in consideration for all the
premiums. The Department consists of its employees who occupy
its vehicles, and it is meaningless to say that the "Department" is
granted any coverage, "broad" or otherwise.
This important point leads to the fundamental error in the
court's reasoning. Since the $4 premiums collected under the
Department's policy afforded protection for only the second class of
insureds of each of the vehicles (i.e., the Department employees),
and since the court held that it was proper for Maryland to pay only
one coverage, then it seems clear that this also applies to Cunningham's INA policy. For if it was proper for Maryland to collect
a $4 premium on each car for only the second class of insureds, then
it was likewise proper for INA to collect a $4 premium on each
vehicle when its policy grants coverage to the second class insured
occupants of Cunningham's several automobiles. The court's reasoning that "where he has paid additional premiums he is entitled
to additional coverages"''0 is, therefore, both unfounded and logically inconsistent with its holding regarding the Maryland policy." 0
109. Id. at 76, 189 S.E.2d at 836.
110. The class (a) insureds (named insured, spouse, and household relatives of each)
was an empty set in the instant case, for the Department of Motor Vehicles itself could never
sustain any bodily injuries. Thus, each of the $4 premiums paid on the Department vehicles
was consideration only for the class (b) insureds (permissive occupants). Since the court did
not allow stacked recovery under the Department policy, it follows that the $4 was valid
consideration for coverage only for the class (b) insureds.
However, the court did allow Cunningham to stack within his own policy because he had
paid separate premiums. But for what were those premiums paid? It seems clear that the
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The Cunningham case is discussed at length here to illustrate
the present conceptual confusion that has resulted in the aftermath
of stacked uninsured motorist recovery. The attempted differientiation between the two paragraphs of the "other insurance" clause",
and the abortive distinction between equal, decreased, and single
premiums discussed earlier,"' likewise illustrate the compounded
disparities that now exist among the jurisdictions that permit interpolicy and intra-policy stacking. And such confusion will only be
perpetuated if these jurisdictions continue to insist upon stacked
recovery in spite of the inconsistencies and inequities which have
been generated.
V.

CONCLUSION

Mandatory uninsured motorist coverage has been enacted in an
effort to fill the gap in the protection afforded the public by existing
financial responsibility laws-the hazard created by the motorist
who has not obtained minimum liability insurance. The stacking of
these UM coverages is understandable from the point of view that
it is perhaps a zealous effort by the courts to provide the insured as
much protection as possible. Nevertheless, it has been shown that
the stacking concept is theoretically unfounded and can only lead
to certain absurd coverage extensions. More importantly, such zealotry enlarging the insurer's coverage will undoubtedly result in the
charging of one increased premium to all insureds irrespective of the
number of vehicles covered under the policies. This would be inequitable because the insured who owns only one vehicle would then
be paying for more than the single coverage he is receiving, since
that expensive premium will be actuarily averaged to cover all policies, including those insuring multiple vehicles where the risk to the
insurer has increased considerably.
Moreover, the ostensible purpose of the UM endorsement is to
provide relatively inexpensive protection to all insureds at least to
the minimum liability limits. The swollen premium cost can only
frustrate that basic intention. In addition, the costly premium
additional $4 premium on his second and third vehicles could be proper consideration merely
for the class (b) permissive occupants of his vehicles, as was the court's holding regarding
the Department's policy.
111. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 91 through 96 supra and accompanying text.
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might force the more parsimonious insureds to reject that coverage,
and the whole purpose behind the UM statutes would perhaps be
unnecessarily subverted.
It is apparent, then, that the quixotic rush by some courts to
the aid of the unfortunate injured insured will soon ironically culminate in the injustices and confusion that were thought to be dissolved. It is suggested that the jurisdictions facing the stacking issue
in the future seriously consider the long-range effects of stacking
multiple coverages, instead of merely following the courts that have
invalidated the several liability limiting provisions within the UM
endorsement of the automobile liability policy.
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